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Measuring What Employers Do about Entry Wages over the Business Cycle: 
A New Approach 
 
Pedro Martins, Gary Solon, and Jonathan Thomas*
 
 
Abstract:  Rigidity in real hiring wages plays a crucial role in some recent 
macroeconomic models.  But are hiring wages really so noncyclical?  We propose using 
employer/employee longitudinal data to track the cyclical variation in the wages paid to 
workers newly hired into specific entry jobs.  Illustrating the methodology with 1982-
2008 data from the Portuguese census of employers, we find real entry wages were about 
1.8 percent higher when the unemployment rate was one percentage point lower.  Like 
most recent evidence on other aspects of wage cyclicality, our results suggest that the 
cyclical elasticity of wages is similar to that of employment. 
 
 
At least since Keynes (1936), macroeconomists have theorized that wages are 
inflexible and that limited cyclical variability of wages may account for the cyclical 
volatility of employment and unemployment.  The idea continues to figure prominently 
in the current literature.  For example, the very first sentence of the recent Journal of 
Political Economy paper by Gertler and Trigari (2009, p. 38) says, “A long-standing 
challenge in macroeconomics is accounting for the relatively smooth behavior of real 
wages over the business cycle along with the relatively volatile behavior of employment.” 
Much of the current interest in the cyclical behavior of wages, especially hiring 
wages, has grown out of a debate about the ability of the canonical Mortensen-Pissarides 
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(1994) model to generate realistically large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment.  In 
that model, wages within a worker/employer match are determined by Nash bargaining.  
The resulting procyclicality in real wages means that, during a recession, lowered wages 
give employers an incentive to hire the unemployed workers that have been laid off by 
other employers.  A problematic implication, pointed out by Shimer (2005), is that, under 
standard parameter values, the model generates much smaller cyclical fluctuations in 
unemployment than actually do occur. 
In keeping with the long macroeconomic tradition of accounting for large cyclical 
employment and unemployment fluctuations by assuming rigid wages, many recent 
theorists – such as Shimer (2004), Hall (2005), Hall and Milgrom (2008), Gertler and 
Trigari (2009), and Kennan (2010) – have suggested stickiness in real hiring wages as a 
way of modifying the Mortensen-Pissarides model to generate realistically large quantity 
fluctuations.  Ultimately, however, whether this is the right way to go should be subject 
to empirical investigation.  How much do real hiring wages actually vary over the 
business cycle? 
Our literature review in section I concludes that we presently lack persuasive 
evidence on this question.  In section II, we propose a new empirical approach – using 
matched employer/employee longitudinal data to identify firms’ entry jobs and then 
tracking the cyclical variation in the real wages paid to workers newly hired into those 
jobs.  In section III, we illustrate our approach with an application to data from the annual 
census of employers in Portugal.  In section IV, we briefly summarize our findings, and 
we discuss their macroeconomic implications. 
 
I.  Existing Evidence on Cyclicality in Hiring Wages 
Of course, there already is a great deal of evidence on real wage cyclicality in 
general.  For example, using 1967-1987 data on workers in the U.S. Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics, Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) estimated that a one percentage 
point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 1.2 percent reduction in real 
wages.  Numerous other studies using longitudinal microdata from the United States and 
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elsewhere have produced similar results.1
 Pissarides (2009) has dismissed theories based on cyclically rigid hiring wages 
because, in his view, the evidence shows that hiring wages are quite procyclical.  His 
view is based on a portion of the longitudinal literature that has found that workers who 
change employers during expansions tend to experience much better wage growth than 
workers who change employers during recessions.  Examples of such studies include Bils 
(1985) and Shin (1994) for the United States; Devereux and Hart (2006) for the United 
Kingdom; and Martins (2007) and Carneiro, Guimarães, and Portugal (forthcoming) for 
Portugal.  Similarly, Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2008) find that individuals moving 
from nonemployment to employment during expansions tend to receive higher wages 
than individuals moving from nonemployment to employment during recessions. 
  But what do we know about the cyclicality of 
hiring wages in particular? 
 Gertler and Trigari (2009), however, explain why such evidence does not rule out 
acyclical wage setting by firms.  Even if every firm maintains cyclically rigid wages in 
each job title, workers taking new jobs will show procyclical wages if, during expansions, 
they face better opportunities to move into higher-paying industries, higher-paying firms 
within industries, or higher-paying jobs within firms.  In contrast, during recessions, a 
larger share of job changers are displaced workers, who often suffer wage reductions 
relative to the jobs they have lost.  As Gertler and Trigari (p. 73) put it, “Suppose, for 
example, that a highly skilled machinist takes a job as a low-paid cab driver in a 
recession and then is re-employed as a high-paid machinist in a boom.  In this case there 
is a cyclical movement in job match quality for the individual” even if the wages in both 
the machinist job and the cab driver job are acyclical.2
                                               
1 See Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1992) for a review of most of the U.S. literature.  More recent U.S. studies 
include Devereux (2001) and Shin and Solon (2007).  Studies of other countries include Devereux and Hart 
(2006), Martins (2007), Carneiro, Guimarães, and Portugal (forthcoming), Peng and Siebert (2007, 2008), 
and Shin (2012)..  
  As Gertler and Trigari emphasize, 
this process of so-called “cyclical upgrading” in worker/employer matches (and cyclical 
downgrading in recessions) has long been discussed and documented.  Early references 
include Reynolds (1951), Reder (1955), Okun (1973), and Hall (1974).  Recent analyses 
2 Bewley (1999, p. 151) earlier made the exact same point: “the findings could result from the effects of 
recession on the level of jobs accepted during recessions rather than from the effects on hiring pay for 
particular jobs.” 
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include Solon, Whatley, and Stevens (1997), McLaughlin and Bils (2001), Devereux 
(2004), and Bjelland, Fallick, Haltiwanger, and McEntarfer (2011). 
 We should note that, from the workers’ perspective, their improved opportunities 
for moving to better jobs in an expansion are a true form of wage procyclicality.  But that 
is not what theoretical analyses such as Hall (2005) are about.  Rather, those analyses are 
attempting to explain the amplitude of cyclical fluctuations in unemployment by 
assuming rigidity in the hiring wages that particular firms pay in particular jobs.  Gertler 
and Trigari therefore are correct in criticizing the existing empirical literature for 
rejecting such theories on the basis of evidence confounded by cyclical 
upgrading/downgrading.   
 To summarize, we agree with Gertler and Trigari’s point that empirical 
assessment of recent theories of hiring-wage rigidity requires an approach that identifies 
cyclical variation in hiring wages within particular jobs.  Towards that end, in the next 
section we propose an approach directly based on tracking hiring wages in particular 
jobs.  
 In this same Journal, in a different approach to the same Portuguese data base that 
we use, Carneiro, Guimarães, and Portugal (forthcoming) estimate worker-level 
regressions of log wages on the unemployment rate, a “new-hire” dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the worker’s tenure is less than 12 months, the dummy’s interaction with the 
unemployment rate, and controls including worker, firm, and occupation fixed effects.  A 
complication is that, with multiple dimensions of fixed effects, it is difficult to discern 
which within-group variation is being used to identify what.  For recent studies that 
express concerns about the economic interpretation of wage regressions with both worker 
and firm fixed effects, see Abowd, McKinney, and Schmutte (2010) and the references 
therein.  Our study complements the one by Carneiro, Guimarães, and Portugal by 
providing relatively transparent evidence based on tracking hiring wages in particular 
entry jobs over recessions and expansions.  As it turns out, their results and ours are not 
radically different.  Like our study and nearly every other longitudinal study of wage 
cyclicality, Carneiro, Guimarães, and Portugal find that real wages are quite procyclical.  
They also estimate that hiring wages are about 20 percent more procyclical than the 
wages of incumbent workers. 
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II.  A New Approach 
 The alternative approach we propose is to identify specific entry jobs within 
particular firms, track the wages paid to newly hired workers in those jobs, and measure 
how those entry wages vary over the business cycle.  A precedent for this approach was 
applied by Solon, Whatley, and Stevens (1997, p. 412), who found that “the entry wage 
for ‘laborers,’ the most common occupation for newly hired workers” in the Byers iron 
tubing and pipe manufacturing company, was procyclical over the 1919-1932 period.  
That result, however, applied to only one company observed over 70 years ago.  In the 
present paper, we take a similar approach with a large number of firms observed between 
1982 and 2008 in an annual census of employers in Portugal.  Because we hope that our 
approach eventually will be applied to other countries besides Portugal, here we describe 
the general methodology.  Idiosyncrasies that arise in the application to the Portuguese 
data set will be addressed in section III. 
 Let jtw  denote the typical real wage paid in period t to workers newly hired into 
job j , which is a particular job into which a particular firm does a substantial amount of 
its hiring of new employees.  A convenient statistical model for jtw  is 
(1) jttjjtw εβα ++=log  
where jα  is a job fixed effect, tβ  is a period fixed effect common to all entry jobs, and 
the zero-mean error term jtε  represents temporary job-specific departures from the 
general period effect.  The object of our analysis is to estimate a time series for tβ  and 
relate it to business cycle conditions. 
 If the data set were a “balanced panel” with every one of the N sampled jobs 
observed in all periods, the estimation of tβ  would be particularly simple.  With the 
mean of jα  normalized to zero, the least squares estimator of each tβ  would be simply 
(2) ∑
=
=
N
j
jtt Nw
1
/logβˆ . 
A figure that plotted the tβˆ  time series along with a cycle indicator such as the 
unemployment rate would give an eyeball impression of the cyclical behavior of entry 
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wages.  A quantitative summary could be obtained by applying least squares to the 
regression of tβˆ  on the unemployment rate with controls for secular time trends.  If non-
stationarity were a concern, the regression could be estimated in first differences instead 
of levels. 
 If the panel is unbalanced because observations of jtw  are missing for some jobs 
in some years, it is still straightforward to estimate tβ  in equation (1) by applying least 
squares to the regression of the available observations of jtwlog  on a vector of period 
dummy variables (for which the estimated coefficients are the tβˆ  series) and a vector of 
job dummies.  Alternatively, exactly the same tβˆ  are obtained by applying least squares 
to the “de-meaned” regression of jtwlog  on a vector of period dummies, in which each 
variable is expressed as a deviation from the job’s time mean of the variable over the 
periods in which that job is observed.  Either way of calculating tβˆ  accounts for period-
to-period changes in which jobs are in the sample by controlling for job fixed effects.  
This tβˆ  series is the same as the sample means in equation (2) except that it is 
regression-adjusted for changes in sample composition.  Again, the tβˆ  series can be 
plotted along with the unemployment rate, and it can be regressed on the unemployment 
rate and time trend variables. 
  Although complications inevitably arise in practice (as will be seen in the next 
section), the basic methodology is almost absurdly simple.  That is what we like about it.  
Our method looks in a direct and transparent way at what employers actually do about 
entry wages over the business cycle.  
 
III.  An Application to Matched Firm/Worker Data from Portugal 
A.  Description of the data 
 In this section, we illustrate our method for measuring entry-wage cyclicality with 
an application to Portuguese data from 1982-2008.  As shown in figure 1, Portugal’s 
annual unemployment rate varied widely over that period, with peaks in the mid 1980s, 
mid 1990s, and mid 2000s.  Another relevant feature of the Portuguese labor market over 
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that period is its system of collective wage bargaining, which is explained in detail in 
Cardoso and Portugal (2005).  The main message of that paper is that the bargained wage 
rates function as wage floors, with employers commonly paying wages above those 
floors.  In the authors’ words (p. 899), “the wage cushion works as a mechanism to 
overcome the constraints imposed by collective bargaining, allowing firms wide scope 
for action in their wage-setting policy….  This operation of institutional forces and 
market forces in the Portuguese economy may help explain why a typically European 
institutional framework is compatible with high wage flexibility and low 
unemployment.” 
 
Figure 1.  Annual Unemployment Rates in Portugal, 1982-2008 
 
  
Our data come from Quadros de Pessoal, an annual mandatory census of all 
employers in Portugal (except that most of the public sector is excluded).  The census 
was conducted in March in each year through 1993 and in October from 1994 on.  
Employer identification numbers enable longitudinal matching of employers.  An unusual 
and valuable feature of this data base is that information on every individual employed by 
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the firm as of the census date is available for every year between 1982 and 2008 except 
1990 and 2001.  The employee information includes current wage rate, detailed 
occupation code, and tenure with the firm.  Employee identification numbers enable 
longitudinal matching of individual workers, even when they change employers, from 
1986 on. 
 The data base suits our purposes very well.  The combination of occupation and 
tenure information for every employee enables us to identify jobs into which each firm 
commonly recruits new employees, and we also observe the wages that the new 
employees in those jobs are paid.  And by tracking those entry-job wages longitudinally, 
we can observe how they vary over the business cycle. 
 To identify a set of jobs into which, year after year, employers are observed to 
hire new workers, we apply a series of sample selection criteria.  In our initial set of 
selection criteria, we first consider only firms that employed at least 50 workers in at least 
five years of the 1982-2008 period.  Second, we define jobs within firms in terms of five-
digit occupation codes (such as supermarket shelf stocker, bank teller, clothing machine 
operator).  When the same occupation code appears for different firms, we treat each 
occurrence as a different occupation/firm job.  We link the occupation codes used from 
1995 on with a different system of codes used through 1994, but, in the process, we lose 
some jobs for which the pre-1995 codes branch out into multiple post-1995 codes.  We 
also require that all workers in the job are at the same “job level,” an eight-category 
variable coded as (1) apprentices, interns, trainees; (2) non-skilled professionals; (3) 
semi-skilled professionals; … (8) top executives (top management).  Third, defining 
newly hired workers as those with no more than four months of tenure with the firm, we 
include a job in our main sample of entry jobs if, in at least half the years the firm is 
present in the data base, the particular job accounted for at least three new hires and at 
least 10 percent of the firm’s new hires in that year.  Of course, this particular set of 
selection criteria is quite arbitrary, and we later explore the robustness of our results to 
varying the criteria. 
 By applying such criteria, we are focusing on what Doeringer and Piore (1971) 
called “port-of-entry” jobs.  We do not mean, however, to subscribe to their stark 
description in which firms hire into only a limited number of such jobs, with other jobs 
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filled almost exclusively by internal promotions and reassignments.  More recent studies 
– such as the case study of a particular firm by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994) – 
have suggested that hiring from outside a firm can take place in a broad spectrum of jobs.  
Our focus on jobs that recurrently show new hires in the annual employer census is 
driven mainly by a pragmatic concern – to identify cyclical variation in hiring wages by 
job, we need those wages to be observed in multiple years spanning different business 
cycle conditions.   
The main sample resulting from our initial selection criteria consists of 1,345 jobs 
in 1,138 firms.  The firms are spread across a wide variety of industries, with the most 
common being manufacturing, construction, retail trade, hotels and restaurants, 
education, and “other business activities” (including cleaning, security, and temporary 
work agencies).  Our panel of wages for newly hired workers in entry jobs is 
“unbalanced,” with a total of 10,213 job/years.  The unbalancedness occurs because some 
firms begin or end between 1982 and 2008; because, in existing firms, it may happen that 
the workers observed in the job as of a particular census month include no one hired 
within the last four months; and because, as explained below, we sometimes are unable to 
identify a modal hiring wage. 
Table 1 displays sample size statistics by year along with the seasonally adjusted 
unemployment rate for the census month.3
 
  The number of entry-job wages observed per 
year ranges from a low of 137 in 1982 to a high of 810 in 2006.  The sample sizes trend 
upward partly because of growth in the Portuguese economy and because of a trend from 
informal to formal employment.  In addition, our requirement that the firm appear with at 
least 50 employees in at least five years of the 1982-2008 period causes us to omit firms 
that became defunct in the early years of our sample period and firms that began in the 
last few years.  These sample composition issues underscore the importance of our 
practice (described in the previous section) of accounting for year-to-year changes in 
sample composition by controlling for job fixed effects. 
                                               
3 These are the Eurostat unemployment rates reported at 
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=132.STS.M.PT.S.UNEH.RTT000.4.000 as of June 
2009.   As these go back only to 1983, we imputed a March 1982 value based on the annual unemployment 
rate from Statistics Portugal. 
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Table 1.  Sample Sizes by Year 
Year Number of Entry 
Jobs 
Number of Newly 
Hired Workers 
Seasonally Adjusted 
Unemployment Rate 
in Census Month 
1982 137 2,770 7.32 
1983 160 3,670 7.67 
1984 137 2,830 8.85 
1985 181 2,836 9.05 
1986 210 3,135 9.31 
1987 219 4,110 7.71 
1988 231 4,187 6.14 
1989 244 6,313 5.35 
1991 238 6,535 4.20 
1992 265 8,248 3.91 
1993 269 7,406 5.06 
1994 299 8,761 7.01 
1995 345 9,777 7.15 
1996 353 10,276 7.15 
1997 378 12,335 6.68 
1998 455 15,184 4.78 
1999 469 14,525 4.26 
2000 513 18,803 3.87 
2002 577 18,485 5.67 
2003 710 26,368 6.48 
2004 790 22,864 7.04 
2005 803 26,048 7.99 
2006 810 24,426 8.00 
2007 744 30,645 7.84 
2008 676 29,091 7.84 
Total 10,213 319,628  
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The last row of table 1 shows a total of 319,628 newly hired workers observed in 
the 10,213 job/years, so on average more than 30 newly hired workers are observed per 
job/year.  On account of procyclical hiring, the number of newly hired workers per 
observed entry job shows a clear tendency to be lower in years of high unemployment.  
Importantly, however, there is not a clear tendency for the number of observed entry jobs 
to decline in those years.  If there were, we would need to worry that rigidity in hiring 
wages in some firms might be causing those firms to disappear from our sample in 
recession years because their hiring into their entry jobs dropped to zero.  Instead, the 
pattern is that hiring declines but remains positive, so that we still observe hiring wages.4
 Obviously, our analysis pertains to only a small fraction of all the jobs and firms 
encompassed in the Portuguese census of employers.  It does, however, focus on those 
jobs that are most clearly recognizable as perennial entry jobs.  Perhaps it is best to view 
our study as a sort of summary of 1,345 case studies of particular entry jobs.  To give a 
sense of who are the workers newly hired into those jobs, figure 2 displays annual 
statistics for mean years of schooling, mean age, and proportion female for the newly 
hired workers in our sample (i.e., the 2,770 sample workers in 1982, the 3,670 in 1983, 
etc.).  For comparison, the figures also show the corresponding population statistics for 
all workers and all newly hired workers in the census of employers.  Not surprisingly, the 
figures show that both our sample of newly hired workers and the population of newly 
hired workers are less educated, younger, and more frequently female than the overall 
population of workers.  The most persistent difference between our sample workers and 
the population of newly hired workers is our sample’s higher proportion female. 
  
Note that, if we followed much of the related literature – such as Carneiro, Guimarães, 
and Portugal (forthcoming) – in treating workers rather than jobs as the unit of analysis 
(or, equivalently, if we weighted jobs by the number of newly hired workers), variation in 
the number of hires by job could cause problems of endogenous sample selection. 
  
                                               
4 We thank David Card, Jonathan Guryan, and Steven Rivkin for raising this issue at the NBER Summer 
Institute. 
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Figure 2.  Average Characteristics of Sample and Population Workers by Year 
 
 
    
 As explained in the previous section, the dependent variable in our first-stage 
regressions is the typical logarithmic real hiring wage in job j in period t.  The wage 
measure we start with is each newly hired worker’s monthly base pay (“corresponding to 
the normal hours of work”) divided by the worker’s normal monthly hours.  This is the 
worker’s base pay in the sense that it leaves out supplementary payments such as 
overtime, bonuses, and late-shift premia.  We later explore the robustness of our results to 
including such supplements.  We use Statistics Portugal’s monthly consumer price index 
(for March through 1993, for October afterwards) to convert the wage to real terms.  Our 
main measure of the typical log hiring wage in a job/year is the modal value (with log 
wages measured to two decimal places).  As mentioned above, we have dropped 
job/years in which we did not identify a modal wage.  This occurred because of ties, most 
often because the job/year contained only two newly hired workers who received 
different wages.  Figure 3 displays, for the 319,628 newly hired workers in our sample, 
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the histogram of the difference between the worker’s log wage and the modal log hiring 
wage in the job/year.  As the figure shows, typically most of the newly hired workers in a 
job/year are paid at the modal rate.  Nevertheless, we later explore the robustness of our 
results to using alternative measures of the typical hiring wage. 
 
Figure 3.  Sample Distribution of Difference between Individual Worker’s Log Wage 
and Modal Log Hiring Wage in Job/Year  
 
 
 
B.  Empirical Analysis 
 As explained in section II, we begin by estimating the year effects tβ  in equation 
(1) by applying least squares to the regression of the logarithm of job-specific real entry 
wages jtw  on year dummy variables with controls for job fixed effects.  As discussed in 
section II, if the panel of entry jobs were balanced with entry wages observed for all jobs 
in all periods, the estimated year effects would be simply   ∑
=
=
N
j
jtt Nw
1
/logβˆ .  With our 
highly unbalanced panel, our estimates essentially regression-adjust that simple statistic 
for year-to-year changes in sample composition. 
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 The resulting tβˆ  series is plotted in figure 4, with the value for 1982 normalized 
to zero.  Recall from section III.A that the series pertains to March for the observations 
from 1982 through 1993, it pertains to October for the observations from 1994 through 
2008, and it is missing the years 1990 and 2001.  The figure also displays the seasonally 
adjusted unemployment rates for the corresponding months.  Eyeballing the figure in a 
way that takes account of the upward secular trend in wages gives the impression that the 
entry-wage series and the unemployment rate are inversely related, but that the 
relationship is very loose. 
 
Figure 4.  Estimated Period Effects for Log Entry Wages in Available Months and 
Corresponding Unemployment Rates, March 1982-October 2008 
  
 
 
 As discussed in section II, we can quantify the cyclicality of entry wages by 
estimating regressions of the tβˆ  time series on the unemployment rate and secular time 
trend controls.  The first row of table 2 shows the estimated coefficient of the 
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unemployment rate when this regression controls for a linear time trend and is estimated 
by weighted least squares (weighting by the number of entry jobs observed per year, in an 
effort to correct for the heteroskedasticity resulting from the wide variation in the per-
year sample size).  The procyclical coefficient estimate of -1.81 (with estimated standard 
error 0.38)5
 We would have liked to re-estimate the regression with the logs of the 
employment/population ratio and real GDP per capita as alternative cycle indicators 
instead of the unemployment rate.  Unfortunately, we have been unable to locate monthly 
or even quarterly versions of these variables for Portugal over our sample period.  The 
Bank of Portugal staff, however, has imputed quarterly series for employment and real 
GDP (neither in per capita form).
 implies that, when the unemployment rate is one point higher (say, .07 
instead of .06), real entry wages tend to be about 1.8 percent lower. 
6
                                               
5 The reported standard error estimates are the old-fashioned kind, i.e., not corrected for heteroskedasticity 
or serial correlation.  Serial correlation diagnostics indicate a first-order autocorrelation of about 0.4 and 
negligible second- and third-order autocorrelations.  Despite having only 25 time series observations in our 
second-stage regressions, we have experimented with Newey-West standard error estimation robust to 
heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation.  The resulting standard error estimates are very close to 
the old-fashioned ones. 
  When we repeat the regression in the first row of table 
2 with the unemployment rate replaced by log real GDP (using first-quarter values up 
through 1993, when our wages are measured in March, and fourth-quarter values from 
1994 on, when our wages are measured in October), the estimated coefficient is 0.55 
(with estimated standard error 0.09).  When we use quarterly log employment as the 
regressor, the estimated coefficient is 1.13 (0.32).  When the regressor is the difference 
between log GDP and log employment, a crude productivity measure, the estimated 
coefficient is 0.69 (0.12).  As discussed later in this section, we have used annual data to 
estimate Okun’s Law-style regressions for Portugal over our sample period.  These 
indicate that, when the unemployment rate goes down by one percentage point, real GDP 
per capita tends to be about 4 percent higher, and the employment/population ratio goes 
up by about 1.6 percent.  In light of these relationships, our estimates of wage 
procyclicality with respect to GDP, employment, and GDP per worker line up fairly 
closely with our estimates using the unemployment rate.   
6 The series are available at http://www.bportugal.pt/en-
US/EstudosEconomicos/Publicacoes/BoletimEconomico/BEAnteriores/Pages/default.aspx?theme=2009. 
See de Castro and Esteves (2004) for an explanation of how the series were constructed. 
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Table 2.  Estimates of Cyclicality of Log Entry Wages in Portugal, 1982-2008 
Estimation Method Estimated Coefficient of Unemployment 
Rate (and Estimated Standard Error) 
1.  Weighted least squares for regression of 
log modal entry wage year effects on 
unemployment rate and linear time trend 
-1.81 
(0.38) 
2.  Same as (1) but ordinary least squares -1.66 
(0.47) 
3.  Ordinary least squares for first 
differences 
-1.48 
(0.78) 
4.  Same as (3) with change from March 
1993 to October 1994 omitted 
-1.91 
(0.83) 
5.  Same as (1) with one-year lag of 
unemployment rate as additional regressor 
Contemporaneous: -1.75 
(0.74) 
Lagged:                  -0.31 
(0.77) 
6.  Same as (1) with quadratic time trend -1.33 
(0.52) 
7.  Same as (1) for blue-collar jobs -1.72 
(0.42) 
8.  Same as (1) for white-collar jobs -1.98 
(0.38) 
9.  Same as (1) with log average wage -1.92 
(0.45) 
10.  Same as (9) with wage measure 
combining base wage with regular 
supplements 
-1.97 
(0.46) 
11.  Same as (9) with wage measure 
including all non-base pay 
-1.97 
(0.49) 
12.  Same as (1) with more inclusive 
definition of entry jobs 
-2.01 
(0.39) 
13.  Same as (1) with new-hire criterion 
reduced to three months of tenure 
-2.03 
(0.45) 
14.  Same as (1) for 1986-2008 -1.59 
(0.38) 
 
 
Continuing to further analyses using the unemployment rate, although 
heteroskedasticity diagnostics applied to the residuals suggest that our weighting 
procedure is reasonable, in the second row of table 2 we use ordinary least squares 
instead of weighted least squares.  The resulting coefficient estimate, -1.66 (0.47), is 
fairly close to the weighted result.  In the third row, we apply ordinary least squares to the 
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first-differenced version of the regression.  A linear time trend in levels implies that, in 
first differences, we need to control for the varying time interval between adjacent 
observations, which is usually 12 months but is 24 months for the 1989-1991 and 2000-
2002 changes and 19 months for the change from March 1993 to October 1994.  The 
resulting estimate, -1.48 (0.78), is somewhat less procyclical than the previous estimates.  
In the fourth row, to check whether our results might be distorted by seasonal factors in 
wage determination, we reestimate the first-difference regression omitting the 1993-1994 
difference, which is from March 1993 to October 1994.  All the remaining observations 
are either March-to-March or October-to-October and hence automatically seasonally 
adjusted.  The resulting estimate, -1.91 (0.83), is somewhat more procyclical. 
 In the fifth row, we revert to the analysis in the first row except that, as a simple 
check for dynamics, we include the 12-month lag of the unemployment rate as an 
additional regressor.7
 In the sixth row, we redo the regression from row 1 except that we control for a 
quadratic time trend.  The estimated coefficient of the squared trend variable is 
statistically insignificant, and the estimated coefficient of the unemployment rate, -1.33 
(0.52), becomes somewhat less procyclical.  In the seventh and eighth rows, we redo the 
regression from row 1 separately for blue-collar and white-collar jobs.  The two estimates 
are fairly similar to each other and to the overall estimate.
  The estimated coefficient of the lagged term, -0.31 (0.77), is small 
and statistically insignificant, and the estimated coefficient of the contemporaneous term, 
-1.75 (0.74), is significantly procyclical.  Combining the estimates, the implied wage 
response to a one-point increase in the unemployment rate in both periods is -2.06. 
8
 The next five rows repeat the analysis from row 1 but with alternative approaches 
to the first-stage estimation of the 
 
tβˆ  series.  In the ninth row, instead of representing the 
                                               
7 The analysis of Portuguese wage cyclicality in Carneiro, Guimarães, and Portugal (forthcoming) uses only 
a lagged unemployment rate, the annual average rate for the preceding calendar year. Up through 1993, 
when wages are measured in March, their unemployment rate regressor is an average from 3 to 15 months 
before; from 1994 on, when wages are measured in October, their unemployment rate regressor is an 
average from 10 to 22 months before. 
8 At some cost to the precision and stability of the estimates, we also have tried disaggregating to the most 
commonly observed industries in our sample.  The resulting estimates are -2.31 (0.56) for real estate and 
other business activities, -2.19 (0.40) for wholesale and retail trade, -1.30 (0.39) for manufacturing, and  
-0.52 (0.65) for construction.  The estimate for construction jumps to -1.67 (0.82) with the inclusion of a 
(significant) squared term in the time trend.  On the other hand, allowing for a quadratic trend cuts the 
estimates for real estate, etc. and trade by about half. 
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“typical” job/year wage jtw  with the modal wage of new hires, we use their average 
wage.  In the second-stage regression, this results in a slightly more procyclical estimate 
of -1.92 (0.45).  This analysis still uses the individual wage measure described in section 
III.A – the worker’s monthly base pay (“corresponding to the normal hours of work”) 
divided by the worker’s normal monthly hours.  In the tenth and eleventh rows, we use 
alternative wage measures.  In the tenth row, we use the average of a wage measure that 
adds in supplements “with a regular monthly nature, on account of subsistence, job 
transport, tenured-related or productivity, punctuality, hard-working/dangerous or dirty 
tasks, night shifts.”  In the eleventh row, we go further by measuring the worker’s wage 
as the ratio of all the worker’s pay in the census month (including overtime, bonuses, 
etc.) to all the worker’s hours in the census month.  The estimates based on these 
alternative wage measures, -1.97 (0.46) and -1.97 (0.49), are slightly more procyclical 
than those using our original base pay measure. 
As we acknowledged in section III.A, our criteria for defining our main sample of 
perennial entry jobs were quite arbitrary.  Therefore, in the twelfth row, we revert to 
using modal base pay, but we try using a more inclusive sample of entry jobs in the first 
stage.  Instead of requiring that the firms employ at least 50 workers in at least five years, 
we require that they employ at least 25.  And instead of requiring that the job involves at 
least three new hires and at least 10 percent of the firm’s new hires in at least half the 
years the firm is in the data base, we require at least two new hires and at least 10 percent 
of the firm’s new hires in at least a quarter of the years.  In the second stage, this results 
in a slightly more procyclical estimate of -2.01 (0.39).  In the thirteenth row, we repeat 
the analysis in the first row except that we define newly hired workers as those with 
tenure of no more than three months instead of four.  The resulting estimate, -2.03 (0.45), 
is somewhat more procyclical than the one based on the four-month threshold. 
 Finally, because some analyses later in this section will involve only the years 
1986-2008, in the last row we redo the analysis of row 1 with only those years.  The 
resulting coefficient estimate, -1.59 (0.38), is a little less procyclical. 
 In general, throughout table 2, most of the estimated coefficients of the 
unemployment rate are in the general vicinity of -1.8.  Recognizing that, with procyclical 
labor force participation, the negative of the change in the unemployment rate is an 
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attenuated version of proportional changes in employment, these estimates imply that the 
cyclical elasticity of entry wages and the cyclical elasticity of employment are of similar 
magnitudes. In particular, we have estimated Okun’s Law-style relationships among the 
unemployment rate, the log of the employment/population ratio, and the log of real GDP 
per capita based on first differences of annual data for Portugal over our sample period.9
The substantial procyclicality we have found in real entry wages becomes more 
striking when one considers that the “cyclical upgrading” discussed in section I may 
cause us to underestimate the true procyclicality of entry wages.  If, in a recession, 
employers are able to recruit a higher quality of workers at any given wage, the effective 
wage they pay per efficiency unit of labor is that much lower.  That this is the likely 
direction of bias is suggested not only by the large quantitative literature cited in section 
I, but also by Bewley’s (1999) interviews with employers.
  
Our results indicate that a one-point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with 
a 1.6 percent reduction in the employment/population ratio.  This procyclicality of 
employment is quite similar to the procyclicality we have estimated for real entry wages. 
10
Do our sample data on observable characteristics of newly hired workers show 
any sign of cyclical upgrading?  Visual inspection of figure 2 does not reveal any clear-
cut cyclicality in the education, age, or gender of our sample of newly hired workers.  
More formally, we have re-estimated some of the regressions in table 2 with average 
years of education of the newly hired workers, instead of their log hiring wage, as the 
dependent variable.  In accordance with the cyclical upgrading story, these estimates do 
show countercyclicality in the education of new hires by job, but the statistical 
significance of the estimates is sensitive to the specification of secular trends.  Our results 
for age and gender are qualitatively similar. 
 
 Another perspective on the estimates in table 2 is that they are fairly similar to the 
estimates of the overall cyclicality of workers’ real wages in the U.S. literature that uses 
longitudinal data to relate workers’ year-to-year changes in log wages to changes in the 
                                               
9 Like the annual unemployment rates plotted in our figure 1, the annual statistics on the 
employment/population ratio and real GDP per capita are drawn from the OECD data base available at 
http://stats.oecd.org. 
10 See pages 279-281 for direct quotations from the employers. Bewley’s summary (p. 278) is, “Most 
employers claimed that labor was far more abundant [in the recession] than during the previous boom….  
The overall quality of applicants improved as well….” 
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unemployment rate.11
 To address the first issue of between-country differences, in table 3 we use 
longitudinal worker data from the Portuguese census of employers to replicate the 
analyses in the U.S. longitudinal literature.  In the tradition of Bils (1985), we estimate 
the regression of workers’ year-to-year change in log real wages on change in the 
unemployment rate.  Following Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994), we break the 
estimation into two steps.  In the first stage, we apply ordinary least squares to the 
regression of the worker’s change in log real wages on year dummy variables and 
changes in the worker’s second, third, and fourth powers of age, which belong in the 
regression if the log wage/age profile follows a quartic in levels.
  This similarity is surprising for two reasons.  First, the estimates 
are for different countries that differ in many ways, including wage-setting institutions 
and the severity and nature of macroeconomic shocks.  Second, they are measuring 
different facets of wage cyclicality.  On one hand, the well-known literature on implicit 
contracts explains why wages might be smoothed in long-term employment relationships.  
Such smoothing of incumbent workers’ wages could cause overall wage cyclicality to be 
less pronounced than the cyclicality of hiring wages in entry jobs.  On the other hand, 
workers’ procyclical opportunities to move to higher-paying jobs (both within and across 
firms) contribute to estimates of workers’ overall wage procyclicality, while our 
estimates of entry-wage cyclicality are designed to hold jobs constant. 
12  In the second stage, 
much as in the third row of table 2, we apply ordinary least squares to the regression of 
the estimated year effects on change in the unemployment rate and the length of the time 
interval between the adjacent censuses.13
  
  The estimates are based on the period 1986-
2008 because worker identifiers are not available before 1986. 
                                               
11 Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994), for example, obtain estimates of about -1.4 for men and less 
procyclical estimates for women.  The literature review in Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1992) demonstrates 
that those estimates are typical of the U.S. longitudinal literature.  Kim and Solon (2005) explain that these 
estimates probably are biased in a countercyclical direction by mean-reverting measurement error in wage 
data based on household survey reports.  Such measurement error is not a factor in the Portuguese data.  
12 A first-order term would be perfectly collinear with the year effects. 
13 We apply ordinary instead of weighted least squares in the second stage for reasons discussed in Dickens 
(1990).  In our worker-level analysis, as opposed to the entry-job analysis in table 2, our first-stage 
estimation involves millions of observations.  As a result, sampling error in the estimated year effects is 
inconsequential, and the error term in the second-stage regression is dominated by unobserved time effects 
common to all workers. 
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Table 3.  Estimates from Regressions of Portuguese Workers’ Change in Log Wages on 
Change in Unemployment Rate, 1986-1987 to 2007-2008 
 
Estimation Method Estimated Coefficient of Change in 
Unemployment Rate (and Estimated 
Standard Error) 
1.  All longitudinally matched workers, 
with controls for age and time 
-1.25 
(0.38) 
2.  Same as (1) but with wage measure 
including non-base pay 
-1.51 
(0.37) 
3.  Same as (1) but for sample restricted to 
workers changing employers 
-2.31 
(0.33) 
4.  Same as (1) but for sample restricted to 
workers staying with same employer (with 
additional control for tenure with 
employer) 
-1.20 
(0.40) 
 
5.  Same as (4) but also staying in same job 
(as well as firm) 
-1.14 
(0.37) 
 
 
The resulting coefficient estimate for the unemployment rate, shown in the first 
row of table 3, is -1.25 (with estimated standard error 0.38).  This estimate is somewhat 
less procyclical than the entry-wage counterpart for 1986-2008 shown in the last row of 
table 2.  This suggests that, between the two factors that cause wage cyclicality from the 
workers’ perspective to differ from cyclicality of job-specific entry wages, the wage-
smoothing factor is at least as important as the cyclical-upgrading factor.  The estimate of 
-1.25, which is similar in magnitude to the estimates in the U.S. longitudinal literature, is 
based on the same measure of workers’ wages used in most of our entry-wage analyses – 
the ratio of the worker’s monthly base pay to the worker’s normal monthly hours.  This 
measure leaves out overtime pay and other such non-base payments, which typically are 
included in the wage measures used in the U.S. longitudinal literature.  In the second row 
of table 3, as in the eleventh row of table 2, we include such pay by measuring the wage 
as the ratio of the worker’s total monthly pay to the worker’s total monthly hours.  The 
resulting coefficient estimate for the unemployment rate, -1.51 (0.37), is even more 
procyclical. 
 As discussed in section I, the wage cyclicality literature based on longitudinal 
worker data has estimated especially strong wage procyclicality for workers who change 
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employers.  In the third row of table 3, we redo the estimation in row 1 with a sample 
restricted to workers who change employers between censuses.  As in the previous 
literature, we find particularly procyclical wages for changers, with an estimated 
unemployment rate coefficient of -2.31 (0.33).  Of course, the wage procyclicality for 
workers who change employers is expected to exceed other measures of wage 
procyclicality because, for this group of workers, cyclical upgrading/downgrading is 
especially salient and wage smoothing is not a factor.  It is worth noting that this estimate 
is more procyclical than the estimates in table 2.  As discussed in section I, Pissarides 
(2009) interpreted the strong procyclicality of employer changers’ wages as evidence of 
strongly procyclical hiring wages, but Gertler and Trigari (2009) criticized that 
interpretation on the ground that employer changers’ wage procyclicality might be driven 
largely by cyclical upgrading/downgrading.  Indeed, although the hiring-wage 
procyclicality we have estimated directly in table 2 is substantial, it is not as great as the 
procyclicality we have estimated for employer changers’ wages.  This pattern is 
consistent with Gertler and Trigari’s critique of Pissarides’s interpretation. 
 In the fourth row of table 3, we redo the row 1 analysis for a sample restricted to 
workers who stay with the same employer from one census to the next.  In the first-stage 
regression, we control for change in the worker’s squared tenure with the employer as 
well as in the worker’s polynomial in age.  The second-stage estimate of the 
unemployment rate coefficient, -1.20 (0.40), is almost as procyclical as our estimate of 
overall wage cyclicality14
                                               
14 This comparison is a little surprising because, in the U.S. literature, the estimates of stayers’ wage 
cyclicality sometimes are noticeably smaller than the estimates of overall wage cyclicality.  But some 
studies – such as Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) and Shin and Solon (2007) – report only modest 
differences. 
 and somewhat less procyclical than the corresponding estimate 
of entry-wage cyclicality in the last row of table 2.  Finally, in the last row of table 3, we 
follow the analysis of U.K. data in Devereux and Hart (2006) by further restricting to 
workers who stay not only with the same employer, but also in the same job title.  This 
restriction reduces the estimated coefficient only slightly to -1.14 (0.37), according with 
Devereux and Hart’s finding of substantial wage procyclicality even for stayers in the 
same job in the same firm.   
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 To summarize, longitudinal worker-based estimates of real wage cyclicality in 
Portugal are fairly similar to those in the U.S. literature.  In Portugal, however, unlike the 
United States at present, it is possible to use detailed employer/employee longitudinal 
data to conduct a direct and transparent analysis of the cyclical behavior of wages paid to 
newly hired workers in a large number of entry jobs.  As discussed in sections I and II, 
these data are well suited for assessing recent theories of firms’ practices vis-à-vis setting 
hiring wages.  Our analyses of the Portuguese data have produced a robust finding that 
real entry wages by job tend to be about 1.8 percent lower when the unemployment rate 
is one percentage point higher. 
 
V.  Summary and Discussion 
 Using longitudinally matched data from Portugal’s annual census of employers, 
we have tracked the cyclical behavior of the real wages paid to newly hired employees in 
over a thousand jobs.  We hope that eventually our methodology will be applied to 
additional countries as the requisite data become available. 
Our estimates suggest that real entry wages in Portugal tend to be about 1.8 
percent lower when the unemployment rate is one percentage point higher.  As noted in 
section III.B, this procyclicality in entry wages is substantial in the sense that the cyclical 
elasticity of this price variable is of approximately the same magnitude as the cyclical 
elasticity of employment.  This finding, like practically all the longitudinal evidence on 
workers’ wage cyclicality, counters a view often stated by influential macroeconomists 
that wages are much less cyclical than employment and unemployment.  Most of our 
estimates of entry-wage cyclicality, however, are less procyclical than our estimated 
wage cyclicality for workers who change employers.  This contrast is consistent with 
Gertler and Trigari’s (2009) criticism of Pissarides’s (2009) interpretation of the 
cyclicality of employer changers’ wages. 
 One reason our findings matter is that some recent (as discussed in the 
introduction) and older attempts at theoretically explaining large cyclical changes in 
unemployment have emphasized rigidity of wages.  Like most recent studies of other 
aspects of wage cyclicality, our study of real entry wages in Portugal has found that 
wages are not rigid, but rather respond considerably to business cycle conditions.  Of 
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course, this finding does not preclude that, in some sense, wages are “insufficiently” 
variable.  Pursuing that idea, however, will require not a theory of wage rigidity, but a 
theory of why wages are not even more variable than they are.15
 Finally, returning to a question posed in the introduction, can the Mortensen-
Pissarides model in particular account for the cyclical variability of unemployment in 
light of the magnitude of the entry-wage cyclicality that we have found?  At first glance, 
it appears the answer may be no.  For example, when Kennan (2010) calibrates his 
modification of the Mortensen-Pissarides model, most of his calibrations match the 
empirical variation in the unemployment rate by assuming that the real hiring wage 
declines by less than 0.7 percent when the unemployment rate rises by one percentage 
point.
  Putting the point 
another way, the very existence of large cyclical fluctuations in employment and 
unemployment indicates that wages do not vary enough to prevent those fluctuations.  As 
emphasized by Pissarides (2009), the continuing challenge to macroeconomic theorists is 
to develop a logically coherent and empirically relevant explanation of why employment, 
unemployment, and wages vary over the business cycle in the ways that they actually do. 
16
As noted by many writers, however, in a world of long-term employment 
relationships, decisions about hiring (and acceptance of job offers) depend not only on 
the initial hiring wage, but also on agents’ expectations about the future course of the 
relationship.  This, of course, is just an application of the old insight that, in a long-term 
employment relationship, the current wage is not necessarily allocative (Becker, 1962; 
Barro, 1977; Hall, 1980).  The answer therefore depends not only on the cyclicality in 
initial hiring wages, but also on the persistence of those wages as the worker/employer 
match continues.  As explained by Kudlyak (2009), if workers hired at a low wage during 
  This is well under half the cyclical variability that we estimate for hiring wages. 
                                               
15 Hall and Milgrom (2008), Kennan (2010), Snell and Thomas (2010), and Perry and Solon (1985) are 
examples of steps in that direction. 
16 In particular, in three of the calibrations shown in the right panel of Kennan’s table 2, he gets the 
unemployment rate to increase by more than two percentage points by having initial hiring wages drop by 
only 0.4 to 1.4 percent.  Of course, one could refer to any number of other variants of the Mortensen-
Pissarides model, such as those in Hall and Milgrom (2008) and Gertler and Trigari (2009).  We emphasize 
examples from Kennan’s models for two reasons.  First, Kennan’s reporting of his calibrations’ 
implications for the covariation between real wages and the unemployment rate is unusually clear.  Second, 
the differences in that covariation across his models are particularly well suited for illustrating our 
concluding point – that future research on the connection between employers’ hiring incentives and initial 
hiring wages will need to take account of the durability of employment relationships and the evolution of 
wages and productivity over the course of those relationships. 
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a recession are somehow locked into a long-term employment relationship at a 
persistently low wage, the labor cost relevant to employers’ recruiting decisions could be 
as cyclical as, or even more cyclical than, the initial hiring wage.  On the other hand, if 
the shortfall in hiring wages during a recession vaporizes soon after the employment 
relationship is initiated (either because the cheaply-hired workers quit or because 
retaining them requires substantial raises once the recession eases), even strong 
cyclicality in the initial hiring wage might have only a minor impact on hiring decisions 
and hence allow for large cyclical variation in unemployment. 
This latter possibility is illustrated in one version of Kennan’s calibrations in 
which the initial hiring wage decreases by 3.5 percent when the unemployment rate goes 
up by 2.3 percentage points.  This version of the model assumes that the elasticity 
parameter in the matching function is 0.5 and that the cyclical variation in the present 
discounted value of newly hired workers’ wages is realized entirely through a short-lived 
dive in initial hiring wages during a recession.  The wages of workers hired cheaply 
during the recession are increased to normal levels once the recession passes.  In this 
way, Kennan achieves sufficient inflexibility in the present discounted value of wages to 
generate realistic cyclical variability in unemployment while also achieving realistic 
cyclical variability in initial hiring wages.  He does not explicitly justify assuming that 
long-term wage contracts would take this particular form, but several other writers – such 
as Thomas and Worrall (1988), Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), and Rudanko (2009) – 
have presented models that point in that direction. 
Ultimately, assessing the allocative importance of initial hiring wages in the 
Mortensen-Pissarides model – or in any model that recognizes the prevalence of long-
term employment relationships – will require a deeper understanding of the durability of 
employment relationships, the evolution of wages and productivity in those relationships, 
and the dependence of both on current, past, and anticipated business cycle conditions.  
The empirical literature pioneered by Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), which is summarized 
in Thomas and Worrall (2007) and extended in Kudlyak (2010), has begun to explore 
these issues, and we believe further research in that area could be highly productive. 
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